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Abstract 
One of the most pressing threats facing the United States is the increasingly effective use 
of improvised explosive devices or IEDs.  Many commonly used techniques to detect explosives 
involve imaging.  The primary drawback of imaging is that it requires interpretation of one or 
more images from each target.  Human interpretation requires extensive training and is subject to 
the chance of false-negatives due to human fatigue. 
To counter the threat posed by IEDs, the signature-based radiation scanning (SBRS) 
technology has been developed.  The goal of this project is to create an automated system, with 
minimal operator assistance, that is capable of detecting at least a gallon-sized explosive sample 
from at least one meter away.  It is hoped that this can be accomplished quickly, in less than 30 
seconds, with high sensitivity and specificity.  The SBRS technique is based on the fact that 
many classes of materials have similar stoichiometries.  For example, many common explosives 
have characteristic concentrations of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen and oxygen.  As neutrons 
interact with a material, unique gamma rays are created based on the composition of the material.  
Specifically, in this work, the gamma rays from inelastically scattered neutrons and from thermal 
neutron capture are investigated.  Two neutron detectors are also used, whose responses depend 
on neutron thermalization in and around the target.  Response templates are created based on 
gamma-ray and neutron responses that are collected from targets that contain explosives,.  These 
templates are developed under different conditions for many different explosive materials to 
create a library of templates.  The collection of responses from an unknown target is compared to 
a subset of the library of templates using a figure of merit to distinguish benign from explosive 
targets.   
 Preliminary experiments were performed at Kansas State University.  A high-
purity germanium detector (HPGe) was used to detect the gamma rays.  Two neutron detectors, 
one covered with cadmium, were used to detect back-streaming neutrons.  A 252Cf radioisotope 
source as well as a Triga Mk III reactor were used as neutron sources.   
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 CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
1.1 The IED Problem 
An IED is defined as “a device placed or fabricated in an improvised manner 
incorporating destructive, lethal, noxious, pyrotechnic, or incendiary chemicals and designed to 
destroy, incapacitate, harass, or distract.  It may incorporate military stores, but is normally 
devised from nonmilitary components” [1].  As of June 30, 2008, 1710 of 4113 recorded 
American casualties in Iraq, over 40%, were due to IEDs [1].  It is obvious that these devices 
present a clear and present danger to soldiers and civilians around the world.  A solution to 
identify and remove these dangerous devices is imperative. 
IEDs are not a new technology.  They have been used in conflicts throughout the world.  
They have notable places in history including derailing trains in World War II and being used as 
tools of assassinations.  The materials used in explosive devices are usually widely available in 
war-torn regions.  This is often the case due to the proliferation of weapons that occurs during 
war and from unexploded ordnance that can be found during conflict.  These devices are perfect 
for guerrilla tactics as they are inexpensive and simple and can be used with much less risk than 
a fighter encounters in open combat.  Their basic construction includes two parts: an explosive 
charge and a detonation system.   
The explosive charge can be some home-made substance or a high yield military 
explosive.  The most prolific use of IEDs in the world is happening in the current Iraq conflict, 
which is an area that has known conflict for decades.  Many of these IEDs use old military 
artillery shells very effectively.  These devices are often created for a specific purpose.  IEDs can 
be designed to be anti-personnel or to take out armored targets.  Surrounding an explosive with 
shrapnel, such as ball bearings or nails, has proven to be a very simple and effective anti personal 
device.   IEDs can take out armored targets with explosively formed penetrators.  This is usually 
done by a shaped charge that focuses the pressure from an explosive to compress and accelerate 
a metal slug which then cuts through armor.   
There are numerous different detonation systems.   An IED can be triggered by an 
operator using a radio or infrared controlled remote.  IEDs can also be designed to detonate 
automatically by magnetic trigger, pressure sensors or a timer.  The electronics for these 
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 detonation systems can be sophisticated, but more often than not, are scavenged from common 
electronics.  Cell phones, remote control toys, garage door openers, kitchen timers and alarm 
clocks all can be converted, with minimal electronic knowledge, to detonation systems.   
IEDs are used in a variety of ways.  They can be placed in high traffic areas with the goal 
of hitting a target as it passes or they can be delivered to a target by a vehicle.  Devices left in 
hiding are often buried under the road with the goal of detonating as a vehicle passes.  These are 
particularly effective as the vulnerable undersides of most vehicles house the fuel tank which can 
trigger secondary explosions and create additional shrapnel from the vehicle itself.  The military 
has designated vehicle based IEDs as VBIED explosive devices.  VBIEDs often carry several 
hundred pounds of explosives and can cause massive amounts of destruction and loss of life.   
The threat from IEDs became apparent not long into the second Iraq conflict.  As the 
number of deaths and injuries from these devices increased, the United States Army put together 
a special task force in the fall of 2004 to find solutions to the IED problem.  This task force 
became a joint operation among the military branches led by the Army in July of 2004 [5].  The 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Task Force, or JIEDD, has been given the job of 
coordinating all Department of Defense efforts to reduce the threat from IEDs.  The fact that 1.23 
billion dollars was allocated to JIEDD for the 2004 billing cycle shows how seriously the 
military views this threat. 
1.2 The Goal 
The goal of this research project was to develop neutron-based technology that can be 
used to detect IEDs that contain nitrogen-rich explosives.  The detection system should be 
effective, mobile, rugged and reliable in detecting a wide variety of IEDs at a distance exceeding 
a meter.  Fulfillment of this goal is a daunting task.  The material this thesis covers concerns the 
proof of concept and prototyping phase of a detection system that uses the signature based 
radiation scanning (SBRS) method.  The initial project goals were divided as follows: 
• Forward Looking – All equipment for the system would need to be operated from 
one side of the target 
• High Sensitivity and Good Specificity – A system is needed that has a low false-
negative rate; that is, the system would rarely declare a target safe when it was in 
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 fact dangerous.  A system with low false-positives is also desired; that is, the 
system would rarely declare a target dangerous when it is not. 
• Stand-off Distances – The system needs to be able to detect explosives from 
some distance.  Ideally, a detection system should operate from a range of several 
meters.  For the initial experiments, the goal was to operate from more than one 
meter. 
• Small Amounts – There is also the need to detect relatively small amounts of 
explosive; the initial goal is to be able to detect amounts as small as a gallon 
(approximately 8 pounds). 
• Automated Analysis – Finally, there is a need to have a system that requires 
minimal user interface.  The computer will collect the data, analyze it, and finally 
display to the operator a safe or potentially dangerous indication. 
1.3 Outline of Thesis 
Existing IED detection methods are reviewed in Chapter 2.  These methods are divided 
into the sub-groups of protection, prevention and detection.  In the protection section, the 
benefits and drawbacks of armor are considered.  A variety of technologies can be used to 
prevent destruction from IEDs, including technologies to help avoid IEDs and others to prevent 
their detonation.  An overview of some of these methods is covered in the prevention section.  
Finally, both bulk and trace detection methods are considered.   
The methodology behind the neutron interrogation based explosive detection approach 
investigated is considered in Chapter 3.  The three key neutron interactions of prompt neutron 
capture, inelastic neutron scatter, and neutron thermalization are reviewed.  The special 
considerations needed for high-energy gamma-ray detection are also considered. 
An overview of some experiments conducted for this project is given in Chapter 4.  Two 
separate neutron sources were used and the benefits and drawbacks of each are considered.  The 
equipment and the experiment arrangements are described.   
The analysis process and the experimental results are described in Chapter 5.  The 
specifics of a template matching procedure are explained and the signatures used in the analysis 
process are identified.  A figure-of-merit and its standard deviation are described and a filter 
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 function is used to distinguish inert from explosive targets.  Results from the two reactor based 
experiments are given. 
A summary of the explosive detection method is given in Chapter 6.  The results are 
reviewed and the benefits and challenges of the method are considered.  Some recommendations 
are given about how to potentially improve the method.  The planned next steps in the project are 
also discussed. 
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 CHAPTER 2 - Previous IED Detection Efforts 
Attempts to prevent loss of life from IEDs can be categorized into three groups; 
detection, prevention, and protection.  Detection can categorize a wide variety of systems and 
methods, all with the goal of identifying and or locating an explosive device.  If IEDs can not be 
located, the next best thing is to prevent their detonation.  This can be done by interfering with 
the device’s circuitry or detonator, or by identifying suspicious areas and avoiding them.  
Finally, if an IED can not be detected or avoided, the last line of defense is protection.  New and 
more advanced armor can protect humans and save lives.  An important distinction in IED 
detection technology is remote detection versus standoff detection.  Remote detection means the 
operator could be at a distance, but the equipment would need to be close to the target to operate.  
Standoff detection is defined as having both the equipment and the operator at safe distances.  
Logically, standoff detection is preferred due to the dual protection offered.  Moreover, remote 
detection systems, as opposed to standoff detection systems, will be either stationary or 
robotically-controlled, which can be problematic in a rugged field environment. 
 2.1 Protection 
Initially, the U.S. Military responded to the increasing threat from IEDs by armoring 
vehicles.  By June 2005, there were between 9,000 and 12,000 high mobility multipurpose 
wheeled vehicles (HMMWV) in Iraq that were armored [2].  This was an effective first step, and 
initially the armor could shield against the relatively simple IEDs being used in the early days of 
the conflict.  However, it did not take long before IED builders adapted and created more 
effective weapons that were capable of taking out the reinforced vehicles.  The early IEDs were 
referred to as “double-bangers” and were usually made from artillery rounds.  The more 
advanced devices were referred to as “five-bangers” and could destroy HMMWVs [2].  An 
embedded journalist, Michael Yon, was quoted as saying, “The enemy has destroyed our most 
powerful armored tanks with underground bombs that leave craters in the roads large enough to 
make swimming pools.  No amount of armor can completely protect us.  Armor is extremely 
important, but given time, the enemy will defeat it.”[2]. 
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 2.2 Prevention 
There are many ways to prevent loss of life from IEDs.  This can be achieved either by 
identifying potentially dangerous areas or by preventing the detonation of the explosive device.  
The following is an overview of some of the technologies being used and developed to prevent 
injury and deaths from IEDs.  
Electronic Jammers – Electronic Jammers were the first IED countermeasures widely 
used in Iraq.  These devices work by using low-power radio frequency energy to jam cell phones, 
satellite phones, cordless phones and other types of remote detonators [3].  These devices are 
versatile and can be vehicle-mounted or handheld [2].  In response to the increasing frequency 
and lethality of IEDs, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld directed the Army to buy 10,000 
Warlock Blue devices, which were the first generation of jammers, in May 2005 [2].  These 
devices are only effective against IEDs that use radio wave remote detonators.  This technology 
can be completely circumvented by using infrared detonators, like garage door openers, or 
pressure detonators.  Another problem has been reports of jammers interfering with the radios 
used by soldiers [3].  This results in soldiers having to shut off their jammers to use the radio 
thereby creating windows of vulnerability.  In addition, a new problem has become apparent with 
the increased use of unmanned aerial vehicles or UAVs.  Specifically, the UAVs can lose their 
radio frequency control links due to interference from these jammers when they are away from 
their control base [3].  In short, electronic jammer devices were very useful in the early battle 
against IEDs, being cheap and reliable against radio detonated bombs, but they are completely 
ineffective against bombs that do not use radio detonators, a fact that has become widely known 
and has made this technology less effective.  
Imagery Analysis [2] - Another method to prevent loss of life from IEDs is a technique 
recently developed called imagery analysis.  One system that uses this is the Buckeye, which is 
being developed at the Topographic Engineering Center at the Engineer Research and 
Development Center within the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers.  The Buckeye system consists of 
a frame camera with an electro-optical sensor, coupled with advanced analysis software to create 
a very detailed, three dimensional image of a terrain.  The whole system is typically mounted on 
a UAV.  The UAV will then repeatedly fly over an area, and compare each pixel to see if any 
changes have occurred.  If overnight, for instance, there appears to be recent digging in a road, a 
problem area can be flagged and avoided until an explosive disposal team can be dispatched.  
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 Imagery analysis technology would not be applicable for many situations such as areas with 
limited aerial visibility, but could be very effective against the large buried road bombs.  
Logistically, it is difficult to monitor large areas, but imagery analysis can be effective in smaller 
high risk zones and major traffic ways. 
Electromagnetic Energy Pulse [3] - This technology, still in development, uses high-
power electromagnetic energy to disable the circuitry of IEDs.  One system currently being 
developed is called the Neutralizing Improvised Explosive Devices with Radio Frequency, or 
NIRF.  Ideally this would be a focused electro magnetic pulse that would scan ahead of vehicles 
and disable any IEDs before they had a chance to detonate, protecting soldiers.  This is still not a 
perfect solution, as it would not be effective against simple IEDs which do not have electronics 
and only use pressure or trip switches.  There is also the possibility that the IEDs could be 
adapted to shield itself from electro-magnetic waves. 
Human Imaging [11] – Although not as widely used as road side IEDs, suicide bombers 
wearing IEDs are also a threat.  Several methods are being developed to see explosives under an 
individual’s clothing.  Thermal imaging has been used because any object between a person’s 
body and the camera will block infrared radiation given off by the body from reaching the 
camera.  One problem with this detection technique is that when a person wears an item close to 
their skin the item’s temperature will approach that of the body making it harder to distinguish.  
Millimeter Wave technology works on similar principles but looks for electromagnetic energy 
generated between microwaves and long infrared waves that are generated thermally from the 
body.    
2.3 Detection 
Protection and prevention are important, but the ideal countermeasure for IEDs would be 
to detect them for collection and disposal.  Detection of IEDs can be broken into two distinct 
categories: bulk and trace detection.  Bulk detection focuses on detecting or seeing the whole 
device, whereas trace detection looks for evidence that might indicate an explosive is present.  
These two techniques can be thought of as macroscopic and microscopic, respectively.  There are 
many techniques that have been developed and many more that are being developed.  Some of 
the most common and promising methods are discussed below. 
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 2.3.1 Bulk Detection 
X-ray Transmission Imaging [6] - Imaging is one of the most popular bulk detection 
methods in place.  X-ray based screening is still used for airport security.  Conventional X-ray 
transmission based imaging machines work on the principle that photons are absorbed by dense 
material, but will pass through lighter material.  A typical system will have a fan-shaped beam of 
X-rays and an array of detectors.  A target is placed between the two and then the detectors 
measure the response of the photons, which depend on the attenuation in the sample.  This can 
give a two-dimensional image of the target based on the densities of materials within the target.  
One of the problems with this system is that depth information is difficult to obtain because the 
system determines the total attenuation through the sample.  Thus, similar results may be 
obtained for a thin dense material or a thick weak absorber.  There is also the problem of an 
explosive device hidden behind a dense object to mask it.  Still, the principles of X-ray physics 
have been investigated for over a century, which has helped to create relatively inexpensive 
systems with fairly reliable results. 
Dual-Energy X-ray Imaging - These systems are the next generation of X-ray systems 
and help fix the problem of shadowing objects with dense material.  A target is scanned with two 
beams having different X-ray energies.  At lower energies, say below 80 keV, absorption of 
photons is affected by the average atomic number and the thickness of the material.  At higher 
energies, the photons are less affected by the average atomic number of the material [6].  
Comparing the two images, the presence of light elements commonly found in explosives, such 
as nitrogen, carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, can be detected.  This system makes use of the fact 
that plastic explosives are made of these light elements, but have a density that is between 30-
50% higher than most common plastics [7].  While dual-energy systems are a definite 
improvement on conventional transmission based X-ray systems, they still suffer from some key 
problems.  The system generates an estimate primarily of the densities of the objects in the 
target, which the operator then has to rapidly interpret.  It might be easy to identify a lead shaped 
teddy bear as inconsistent, but not a laptop constructed from a plastic explosive with a detonator 
hidden in the computer circuitry. 
3D X-ray Imaging [6] - This is another step up the technological ladder for X-ray based 
imaging.  There are several kinds of three dimensional imaging; one of the most common is 
computed tomography, or CT.  This technique was originally developed for medical imaging, but 
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 has since been adapted for many applications such as non-destructive testing and security 
screening.  CT works on the same principle as transmission based radiography.  Some CT 
systems use a dual energy scanning technique to get improved images.  These systems typically 
work by taking multiple “slices” through the object while rotating either the source and detectors 
around it or the object itself.  Responses from all of these “slices” are then used to create a two-
dimensional cross-sectional image, through a reconstruction algorithm.  CT requires around 100 
views from a 1024-element linear X-ray detector in order to produce a 1000 × 1000 pixel slice 
image.  To maintain a high signal to noise ratio, a very high intensity X-ray source is required, 
which results in a substantial radiation dose to the target.  A CT system in service for FAA 
inspections is the CTX5000, which requires the X-ray scanner to rotate at 15,000 rpm in order to 
scan a target moving at 0.25 m/s.  This method can create extremely detailed three-dimensional 
images from many two-dimensional images, but the systems are expensive and inspection times 
are relatively long.  
X-ray Fluorescence (XRF) [8] – XRF can be used to get an idea of the composition of a 
target being scanned.  It works by bombarding a molecule with radiation such as X-rays, 
knocking out an inner shell electron, whose vacant shell is then filled by an outer shell electron.  
The binding energy for inner shells is more than for outer shells and a photon with a 
characteristic energy equal to the difference in shell energies is emitted.  This is usually more 
effective for heavy elements having high atomic number (Z), which makes this method more 
useful at detecting detonators rather then explosives.  The main drawback of this technique for 
IEDs is that it is hard to scan past the surface of a target because of the relatively low energyies 
of the X-rays given off.  An absorbing material surrounding an IED would block both the 
incident, as well as the generated photons. 
Backscatter X-ray Radiography [6] – This technology, based on backscattered X-rays, 
has improved in recent years.  The key difference, as compared to those previously discussed, is 
that this technology creates an image based on X-rays that scatter back towards the X-ray source 
instead of those that pass through the target.  There are some key advantages of this technique 
over standard X-ray imaging.   Backscattered images are created from the competition between 
photoelectric absorption and Compton Scattering.  The likelihood of a photon undergoing 
photoelectric absorption rapidly increases with atomic number, whereas the likelihood of 
Compton scattering is proportional to Z/A, which is fairly constant for most elements, hydrogen 
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 being the biggest exception.  Because of this, the image created by backscatter emphasizes low 
atomic number (Z) materials with high densities.  Areas that contain explosives would be 
expected to show up as light areas.  This makes backscatter radiography ideal for detecting 
common nitrogen-rich explosives.  Because of the dependence on atomic number, this technique 
has also been called Z-Backscatter imaging.  This technique however, still suffers from the 
common flaws found in most imaging techniques.  Explosives can still be masked by 
surrounding them with denser material, and the images require a trained operator to analyze the 
image making the system only as good as the alertness and skill of the operator.  The image is 
also dependent on the proximity to the target.  With its current limited range, this technique 
would be classified as remote detection.  As this technique is still being developed, time will tell 
if it can be used for true stand-off detection or just remote detection. 
PIPAR Imaging [9] – The basis for imaging with photon-induced positron annihilation 
radiation (PIPAR) is to help get around the limited penetrating ability of X-rays in dense 
material.  Most techniques that use Compton scattering employ photons below 1 MeV because of 
the reduced chance of Compton interactions taking place for photons of higher energy.  PIPAR 
results when an incident photon of at least 1.022 MeV interacts with an atom and creates an 
electron and a positron.  The positron slows and then annihilates, generating two photons, 
usually with energies of 511 keV.  These 511 keV gamma rays are of relatively high energy, 
offering them a good chance of escaping the target and reaching the detector.  PIPAR reveals 
something of the composition of the target because the probability of pair-production to occur 
varies approximately as Z(Z+A) where A is the mass number [9].  This technique has the 
advantage of interrogating a target deeper than low-energy X-rays, as well as giving clues about 
the composition.  It has the same drawbacks of any imaging system that requires user 
interpretation. 
Neutron Based Interactions [10] – There are several different neutron interactions that 
can be used by neutron-based explosive detection systems.  Some of the main techniques are 
listed below. 
• Thermal Neutron Analysis – TNA uses thermal neutrons to interact with a 
material and create both prompt and delayed gamma rays. 
• Fast Neutron Analysis – FNA uses high energy neutrons to create gamma rays 
from inelastic scattering reactions.  
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 • FNA/TNA – Uses a pulsed neutron source that creates high energy and thermal 
energy neutrons for both TNA and FNA. 
• Pulsed Fast Neutron Analysis – PFNA uses a neutron source that is pulsed for 
nanoseconds to generate FNA. 
• Associated Particle Imagining – API uses the alpha particle produced in a D-T 
reaction to indicate the time that a neutron is emitted.  The time that a signal is 
received from, say, an inelastically scattered gamma ray can then be used to 
indicate the depth at which the inelastic scatter occurred. 
• Nuclear Resonant Absorption – NRA uses neutrons over the 0.5 to 4 MeV range 
to create elastically and resonantly scattered neutrons. 
These technologies all work on the same principle of using a neutron source to bombard a 
target.  The neutrons then undergo a variety of interactions within the target, based largely on the 
neutron energy.  By looking for the hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen and oxygen prompt-capture and 
inelastic-scatter gamma-ray responses, it is possible, in principle, to detect explosives.  Neutron-
based methods have some key advantages.  Neutrons are not stopped easily by dense material so 
the incoming radiation has a good chance to penetrate into the target.  The generated gamma rays 
usually are of high energy, typically over 1 MeV, which means they stand a better chance of 
escaping the target and getting back to the detectors.  This makes the whole process better at 
interrogating deeper into a target.  These methods also have the advantage of a completely 
automated analysis that requires no user interpretation. 
2.3.2 Trace Detection 
Trace detection refers to the identification of explosives from vapors and/or particles 
given off by explosive compounds.  One of the primary problems with vapor detection is the low 
vapor pressure that some explosives have.  This low vapor pressure results in low explosive 
vapor in the air near a sample.  Some examples are EGDN with 64 parts in 106, TNT with 6 parts 
in 109, and C-4 with 6 parts in 1012 parts of air [11].  These figures illustrate the difficulty of a 
technology that tries to detect vapor and particles given off by explosives.  This method requires 
a very high degree of efficiency in order to detect the small amounts of vapor in the air.  
Nonetheless some effective methods have been developed, which are discussed next. 
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 Canine [11] – A tried and true method for detecting explosives has been the use of dogs 
as explosive vapor detectors.  The Department of Defense (DoD) currently has about 1300 dogs 
with 500 trained to detect explosives.  The DoD training program for dogs involves 27 different 
targets that can be hidden up to 8 feet above the ground or buried up to 3 feet below the ground 
and the dogs must maintain a 95% success rate.  Dogs have some distinct advantages over 
electronic options.  Dogs are very mobile.  They can move around a room or building and over 
rough terrain easily, which remotely operated machines can not.  Dogs also have the ability to 
follow the scent to its source.  The vapor plume off an explosive can extend for some distance.  
When the dogs detect it they will follow the scent cone back to its source locating the explosive 
for the handler.  Although canine training programs for explosive detection usually require over 
100 days, the cost is still cheaper than most electronic counterparts.  However, dogs have a 
relatively short duty cycle of 40 to 60 minutes before the animals need a break.  The dog’s 
effectiveness is also dependent on the environment and circumstances such as severe weather or 
noises.  Dogs also cannot tell the handler what explosive is found, only that one exists.  So while 
there are many positive aspects of using dogs for explosive detecting, there are also some serious 
drawbacks that must be considered. 
Bugs [12] – Bee olfactory senses are actually more effective than canine’s.  Some 
research has been done to use bees in place of dogs.  The bees are trained through Pavlovian 
Conditioning, also known as Classical Conditioning.  The bees are exposed to explosive vapor 
and then given nectar.  Over time the bees come to expect the nectar after smelling the explosive 
and will extend their proboscis in anticipation.  By watching the bees’ reactions, the presence of 
explosive vapor can be identified.  While bees have a more sensitive olfactory sense, there are 
several problems with this method.  One prototype system puts the bees in a harness with a 
camera focused on the bee’s proboscis.  However, the bees typically don’t live very long 
harnessed.  One also loses the mobility and the ability to follow an explosive vapor to a source.  
Although an interesting idea, the feasibility of a technology that uses bees remains uncertain. 
Chemical Sensors [11] – There are several technologies that all work on the principle of 
using electronic sensors to detect the presence of explosive vapors.  Chemiluminescence works 
by electronically exciting NO2  and then using a photomultiplier tube to detect the light excited 
by the molecule.  Ion Mobility Spectrometry, or IMS, works by ionizing the vapor molecules and 
then measuring how long they take to drift a set distance.  The drift speed depends on the size of 
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 the molecule, and by measuring the drift time, different molecules can be identified.  Gas 
chromatographs use the electronegative property of explosive vapors to identify them from other 
molecules.  There are many more variations of vapor detection techniques that each have their 
own strengths and weaknesses.  The main problem with all of these systems is the low 
concentration of explosive vapor which results in the detectors having to be very close to the 
target to be effective.  In field conditions the problem is exacerbated with convection currents 
and wind.  While it certainly has its applications, these vapor detection systems will most likely 
never be able to operate at true standoff distances under outdoor field conditions. 
Laser-Induced Breakdown Spectroscopy – This system uses infrared radiation to scan 
the outside of objects.  When the laser comes in contact with residual explosive particles it 
creates microbursts.  The light from these microbursts is characteristic of the explosive involved.  
Laser trace detection technology has the potential to detect explosives very rapidly, near real-
time [6].  This technology also has the potential to detect explosives from as far away as 30 
meters [3].  While a very promising technique to look for residual explosive on objects, its 
inability to scan inside a target will mean a laser system would probably need to work in tandem 
with another system, perhaps with this neutron interrogation technique as a preliminary filter.   
Spot Tests – A cheap and effective way of detecting explosives, swipes or spot tests have 
been used for years.  These work by using chemicals that undergo a color change or some other 
reaction when interacting with an explosive.  Spot tests can be used to help identify which type 
of explosive is present, but are not available for all explosives [8].  Moreover, as this method 
requires actual contact with the target, it can only be described as remote detection.   
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 CHAPTER 3 - Present Methodology 
Conventional explosives derive their energy from chemical bonds within compounds.  
When these compounds are exposed to enough heat, shock or electrical charge they quickly 
rearrange their molecular structure, breaking down into reaction products.  Some of the energy 
that was used to hold the molecules together is released, as well as energy from the formation of 
reaction products.  Most common explosives fall into the category of nitrogen-rich explosives.  
The reason for this is because of the chemical properties of nitrogen.  Nitrogen gas is one of the 
most stable compounds on the planet with a triple bond between the two nitrogen atoms.  When 
one mole of nitrogen atoms bond, 960 kJ are given off.  The more nitrogen atoms present in an 
explosive, the more free nitrogen atoms available when the substance begins to break down and 
the more energy given off by the formation of nitrogen gas.  This is why most common 
explosives are called nitrogen-based and have an unusually high fraction of nitrogen atoms.  The 
levels of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen in these explosives are unique and can be used 
to distinguish them from other materials.  Not all explosives are nitrogen-rich but it is fair to say 
the nitrogen-rich explosives are the most common world wide.  Figure 3.1 illustrates that a 
window exists within which most nitrogen rich explosives are distinguished from other materials 
based are their ratio of nitrogen and oxygen.  Figure 3.2 provides another example of the unique 
elemental composition of explosives compared to other materials. 
Knowing the approximate chemical composition of explosives is an important first step 
to identifying them.  The signature-based radiation scanning method involves the active 
interrogation of a target with neutrons, causing atomic interactions that generate a set of 
responses or signatures.  These interactions produce characteristic responses that allow for 
identification of the composition of a target by comparing the responses from the target with 
those from a typical explosive.  There are three neutron interactions that are considered to 
generate gamma ray and neutron responses.   
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Figure 3.1.  Explosive compositions, with respect to oxygen and nitrogen concentrations, 
compared to some inert materials [14]. 
 
3.1 Prompt Neutron Capture 
Since a neutron has an electrical charge of zero, its kinetic energy is not affected as the 
neutron approaches a nucleus.  Neutrons of any energy can cause nuclear reactions as they are 
not affected by the Coulomb-barrier.  It is more likely, however, for low energy neutrons to 
undergo radiative capture or the (n, γ) reaction.  Neutrons can be broken into several groups.  
Fast neutrons are generally considered to have energy greater then 1 MeV.  Epithermal neutrons 
are generally considered to have energy between about 0.2 eV and 1 MeV.  Thermal neutrons are 
defined to have an energy of less then 200 meV.  The most probable energy of neutrons in 
thermal equilibrium with a medium whose temperature is 293 k is around 0.025 eV.  Thermal 
neutrons can also be characterized by their most probable speed (2198 m/s) or energy (4 × 1021 J) 
[13].   
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Figure 3.2.  Compositions of some explosives and some benign HCNO materials [14]. 
 
Radiative capture involves a nucleus absorbing a neutron and a compound nucleus being 
formed.  This nucleus is in an excited state, which decays to the ground state by gamma-ray 
emission.  This reaction is often referred to as prompt capture because the nucleus usually decays 
in around 10-16 s.  It does so by emitting one or more gamma rays in a cascade.  These prompt-
capture gamma rays have characteristic energies, which can be used to identify the isotope from 
which the gamma ray was emitted [13].  
The probability of this interaction taking place is defined by its cross section which has 
units of barns (1 barn is equivalent to 10-28 m2). This capture cross section is largely a factor of 
the incident neutron energy.  This can be modeled by the 1/ν law which means the cross section 
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 and the velocity of the neutrons are inversely proportional.  Most tables of prompt gamma-ray 
energies are tabulated for 2200 m/s neutrons [13].  The energies generated from 2200 m s-1 
neutrons for the predominant peaks generated from hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, and oxygen are 
listed in Table 3.1.   It was discovered early in the project that most of the prompt gamma rays 
were not useful because the cross sections were too small to distinguish them from the 
background radiation.  In the end, only the 2.223 MeV capture gamma ray from hydrogen, the 
1.262 MeV capture gamma ray from carbon, the 0.871 MeV capture gamma ray from oxygen, 
and the 10.829 MeV gamma ray from nitrogen were used.  Although the efficiency of the 
detectors was very low for the 10.829 MeV gamma ray, the lack of competing signatures at the 
energy range made it viable.  A list of prompt gamma rays and their cross sections can be seen in 
the following table.  All prompt-capture gamma rays are listed for carbon, hydrogen and oxygen 
but only the most probable are listed for Nitrogen, as there are more than 60 prompt-capture 
gammas for this element. 
 
Table 3.1.  Table of thermal capture gamma-ray energies for hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, 
and oxygen [20]. 
Element Energy (keV) σ(barns)  Element Energy (keV) σ(barns) 
Hydrogen 2223.248 0.3326  Nitrogen 5269.159 0.0236
Carbon 1261.765 0.00124  Nitrogen 5297.821 0.0168
Carbon 3683.92 0.00122  Nitrogen 5533.395 0.0155
Carbon 4945.301 0.00261  Nitrogen 5562.057 0.0084
Nitrogen 1678.281 0.0063  Nitrogen 6322.428 0.0145
Nitrogen 1681.24 0.00129  Nitrogen 7298.983 0.00746
Nitrogen 1884.821 0.0147  Nitrogen 8310.161 0.0033
Nitrogen 1999.69 0.00323  Nitrogen 9148.98 0.00129
Nitrogen 2520.457 0.00441  Nitrogen 10829.12 0.0113
Nitrogen 2830.789 0.00134  Oxygen 870.68 1.77E-04
Nitrogen 3531.981 0.0071  Oxygen 1087.75 1.58E-04
Nitrogen 3677.732 0.0115  Oxygen 2184.42 1.64E-04
Nitrogen 4508.731 0.0132  Oxygen 3272.02 3.53E-05
 
3.2 Inelastically Scattered Gamma Rays 
Inelastic scattering of neutrons is also known as the (n, n’) reaction.  Inelastic scattering 
is a form of capture scattering in which an incident neutron is absorbed by the scattering nucleus 
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 which then forms a compound nucleus.  The compound nucleus decays by emission of a neutron 
and the residual nucleus is left in an excited state in inelastic scattering [22].  The excited nucleus 
then returns to ground state by emission of a gamma ray of energy equal to the change in the 
quantum state of the nucleus.  This reaction can only occur when the neutron incident on a 
nucleus has energy above the threshold energy of the first excited state of the scattering nucleus 
[13].  The threshold energy Et, for inelastic scattering to take place is given by 
    Q
A
AEt
1+ ,     (1) −=
where A is the atomic mass of the target nucleus and Q is the Q value of the reaction.  The Q 
value is unique for each state to which the nucleus is excited.  The larger the nucleus, the more 
quantum states, and therefore the more inelastically scattered gamma rays can be generated.  
Plots of the cross sections for the possible gamma rays that can be generated, for different 
excited states, for carbon, nitrogen and oxygen are given in Figs. 3.3 – 3.5. 
 
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 1
Energy (MeV)
σ
 (B
ar
ns
)
1st
2nd
3rd
8 20
 
Figure 3.3.  The inelastic gamma-ray cross sections for carbon, as functions of neutron 
energy [generated from MCNP5]. 
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Figure 3.4.  The inelastic gamma-ray cross sections for nitrogen, as functions of neutron 
energy [taken from the National Nuclear Data Center]. 
 
 
0.0
0.1
0.1
0.2
0.2
0.3
5 7 9 11 13 15 1
Energy (MeV)
σ
 (B
ar
ns
)
1st
2nd
3rd
4th
5th
6th
7 19
 
Figure 3.5.  The inelastic gamma-ray cross sections for oxygen, as functions of neutron 
energy [taken from the National Nuclear Data Center]. 
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 It is clear that the probability of the interaction varies with energy, and there may be a 
low probability for the reaction to occur even if the neutron has an energy above the threshold 
energy required for the reaction.   
3.3 Thermalization 
As neutrons move through material they collide with atoms and lose energy through 
elastic scattering.  The ratio of the final (Ef) and initial (Ei) kinetic energies of a neutron in the 
LAB frame of view is given by  
    2
*
)1(
1cos2
A
A
+
++ θ2A
E
E
i
f = .     (2) 
In this equation θ* is the scattering angle and A is the mass of the scattering nucleus.  From this 
equation it can be seen that the maximum energy loss occurs with a nucleus of similar size to a 
neutron.  That is why hydrogen makes the most effective moderator of neutrons.  By measuring 
the ratio of backscattered thermalized neutrons, a gage of hydrogen content can be estimated. 
The actual thermal neutron count was recorded by using two LiI(Eu) scintillating neutron 
detectors.  One was covered in a 1mm sheet of cadmium, which filters thermal neutrons because 
of its enormous thermal neutron absorption cross section.  This resulted in one detector detecting 
both fast and thermal neutrons, and the other detecting only fast neutrons.   
3.4 Gamma Ray Detection 
The gamma rays themselves presented their own problems for detection as they were of 
much higher energy than those usually detected in spectroscopy.  The problem with detecting 
high energy gamma rays is that they rarely deposit all of their energy in the detector before 
escaping.  There is a limited active region in a HPGe detector and if the gamma ray escapes 
before depositing all of its energy, then the full energy of the gamma ray will not be counted.  
Figure 3.6 shows how the efficiency of a 15% efficient HPGe detector decreases with respect to 
incident gamma-ray energy.  It can be seen that the efficiency of this detector drops by orders of 
magnitude between 100 keV and 10 MeV.  This makes the high energy gamma rays, like the 
10.829 MeV prompt-capture gamma ray from nitrogen, difficult to measure because if thousands 
of gamma rays make it to the detector, only a few will be counted.  However, the trade-off is that 
there are few competing gamma rays at those high energies to mask the signature. 
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Figure 3.6.  Graph of 15% efficient HPGe detector with respect to energy (keV) [21]. 
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 CHAPTER 4 - Experiments 
4.1 Setup 
A 20% efficient Canberra high purity germanium (HPGe) detector (model GC2019) was 
used to collect the gamma-ray spectra.  This detector was connected to a Canberra InSpector 
2000 MCA (Model IN2k), which was connected to a laptop computer that used Genie 2000 
spectroscopy software.  The net peak areas for each of the gamma-ray signatures were estimated 
using the region-of-interest (ROI) function of Genie.  This was accomplished by placing ROI 
points on each side of a peak.  The software then determined the total integral and baseline 
continuum within the ROI.  The total integral T was simply solved for by summing all of the 
counts within the ROI.  The baseline continuum B was estimated as the number of counts within 
a trapezoid bounded by the ROI end points and a straight-line fit between the ROI end points 
(the gray area in Fig. 4.1).  (This is also the area of a rectangle of width W and appropriate height 
H, as also shown in Fig. 4.1.)  Then the net peak area N was solved for by subtracting the 
baseline continuum from the total integral, i.e.  
N T B− .   (3)  =
The standard deviation of the net peak area also was given by the Genie software.  In principle, 
this can be estimated using the propagation of errors formula  
 ( ) ( ) ( )
1/ 22 2
2 2N Bσ⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
) ( ) 1/ 22 2 Bσ
NN T
T B
σ σ∂ ∂⎛ ⎞= +⎢⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ,  (4a) 
which reduces to  
 ( ) (N Tσ σ⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦
( )2 T Tσ =
, (4b) 
( )2 Bwhere  is the variance in the total integral and σ  is the variance in the baseline 
continuum.   
Two Lil(Eu) scintillation neutron detectors (Model 25B3), one cadmium covered, were 
used to find two neutron scatter signatures.  They were connected to Spechtech neutron counters 
(Model ST 360), which then were connected to the laptop.  Figure 4.2 shows a schematic of the 
equipment used. 
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Figure 4.1.  Example of net peak area.  
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Figure 4.2.  A schematic of the radiation detection equipment used in the experiments. 
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 The first step in conducting the experiments was calibrating the HPGe detector.  Most 
calibrations are done with check sources that emit decay gamma rays at known energies.  That 
was not sufficient for these experiments because decay gamma rays rarely have energies above 1 
MeV.  As an energy spectrum of up to 11 MeV was needed, the system would have to 
extrapolate the remaining range so a multi-stage calibration was used.  First, check sources were 
used to determine the high-voltage and gain needed to have the multi-channel analyzer’s (MCA) 
channels cover the desired energy range.  Once that was done, a preliminary calibration was 
done with check sources.  This was a close enough calibration that then allowed for the 
identification of higher energy gamma rays.  Prompt gamma rays given off from a NaCl2 salt 
block were used to generate the high-energy gamma rays needed.  Figure 4.3 is an example of a 
typical collected spectrum.  This spectrum was collected from the NaCl2 block with the 
highlighted peaks being those used in the calibration. 
 
 
Figure 4.3.  Example spectrum. 
 
There are many peaks collected during an interrogation; some of which are within a few 
keV of each other, making it difficult to identify which peaks belong to which elements.  Thus, it 
is important to have a precise calibration of the detection system.  After collecting the channel 
numbers that each of the known calibration peaks were centered on, a linear calibration could be 
performed.  An example of this can be seen in Figure 4.4. 
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Figure 4.4.  Example of calibration. 
 
The large number of detectable chlorine prompt gamma rays was useful in generating a 
good calibration line that minimized extrapolation by the system.  
4.2 Reactor Based Experiments 
For the majority of the experiments, the tangential beam port of the Triga Mk II nuclear 
reactor at Kansas State University was used as a neutron source.  This neutron source had 
advantages and disadvantages.  The reactor produces a relatively high flux of about 106 n cm-2 s-1 
at 50 cm from the outer wall of the tangential beam port.  The beam port also produces a highly 
collimated beam, which is useful for interrogating smaller samples and reduces background in 
the collected spectra.  The width of the beam was measured using a neutron detector and taking a 
1 minute count in 1 inch increments across the front of the target.  It was discovered that at 3 
meters from the bioshield wall of the reactor, the beam width was around 5 inches as can be seen 
in Figure 4.5.   The tangential beam port also had a much lower gamma background than other 
beam ports.   
The disadvantages are that the 235U fission spectrum produces relatively few high energy 
neutrons, which are required to excite some of the inelastic-scatter gamma rays.  The most 
probable neutron energy from the fission of  235U is 0.7 MeV with an average energy of 2.1 MeV 
[8].  Figure 4.5 shows a thermal fission spectrum from 235U and a spontaneous fission spectrum 
from 252Cf. 
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Figure 4.5.  Beam width of S.E. beam port neutron beam of K-State Triga Reactor at 3 m 
from bioshield. 
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Figure 4.6.  Energy spectrum of prompt neutrons produced from U-235 and Cf-252 as 
calculated by Walsh [1989]. 
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 In addition to the already few high-energy neutrons, the fact that the thermal beam port 
was tangential to the reactor meant that only scattered neutrons were in the beam, further 
reducing the average neutron energy.  It was necessary to use this beam port, however, as the 
gamma-ray background would be too high from the other three beam ports.  The reactor is also a 
fixed facility and thus is not a suitable neutron source for a field system. 
For these experiments, 3.8-L (one gallon) cans were filled with several different 
materials.  Fertilizers were used to simulate explosives.  The first (FertA) contained 30% N, the 
second (FertB) contained 36% N, and the third (FertAB) was a 50-50 mixture of the two.  In one 
experiment, ammonium nitrate was used as a fourth explosive surrogate.  Inert materials 
included sand, chalk, aluminum, plastic, water, rubber, and an empty can.  The containers were 
placed inside a suitcase 2.5 meters from the end of the beam-tube shutter.  The HPGe detector 
was placed on the same side as the reactor and was over a meter from the suitcase.  A diagram of 
the experimental layout for the reactor experiments is shown in Figure 4.7.  The experiments 
were performed by first bringing the reactor up to power, usually 500 kW.  The tangential beam 
port had a shutter in front of it that when closed allowed for a safe working environment so 
samples could be changed without having to shut down the reactor.  The shutter was opened and 
a spectrum was collected, then the shutter was closed, the samples changed, and the process 
repeated.  Two photographs of the experimental arrangement are provided in Figs. 4.8 and 4.9. 
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Figure 4.7.  Diagram of the experimental layout for the reactor experiments. 
 
 
Figure 4.8.  Suitcase with sample. 
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Figure 4.9.  Overview of experiment. 
4.3 Californium Based Experiments 
In an attempt to move towards a working prototype, as well as use more inelastic gamma-
ray signatures, a Californium-252 source was used.  Approximately 3% of the radioactive decay 
from 252Cf occurs by spontaneous fission.  The 252Cf source at Kansas State University weighed 
1.157 x 10-5 grams in May 2008.  Since 1 microgram of Cf-252 emits 2.314 x 106 n/s, this gave 
the activity of the source to be approximately 3 x 106 n/s and the uncollided flux at 140 cm from 
the source was estimated to be 14 n cm-2 s-1.  The 252Cf source produces neutrons that have a 
probable energy of 0.75 MeV and an average energy of 2.1 MeV [17].  The fission spectrum 
from Cf-252 can be modeled by a Watt distribution, like 235U, but it is slightly shifted to a higher 
energy as shown in Fig 4.6.  Although a 50 keV increase in probable neutron energy was not 
significant over the U-235 spectrum, it was presumed to be a significant increase over the 
spectrum from scattered neutrons at the exit of the tangential beam port. 
The Cf-252 source had only been used for calibrations in the past and was not collimated.  
This required the construction of a collimator that would focus the beam at the target, as well as 
shield the surrounding area from the source.  The material used for the collimator was 5% 
borated polyethylene and the radiation simulation program, MCNP5, was used to find the 
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 required thickness to have the dose at the outer wall of the collimator be less then 2 mrem per 
hour.  A typical MCNP5 input dataset for one of these simulations is provided in the Appendis.  
A schematic of the cross section of the collimator can be seen in Figure 4.10.  It was a 26 inch 
cube that was placed on top of the 252Cf source with a 2 inch square beam tube that was 12 
inches long to collimate the neutrons.  The construction of the collimator used stair stepped 
pieces to prevent neutron streaming through spaces.  After construction, the dose rates were 
measured at all sides to be approximately 1.8 mrem per hour.  The beam width at the target was 
also measured using the same process done with the reactor and was found to be around 20 
inches wide with the results shown in Figure 4.11.  This large beam width was expected 
considering the relatively short collimator length.  A picture of the partially assembled collimator 
is show in Figure 4.12. 
 
Figure 4.10.  Cross-section schematic of californium collimator. 
A similar setup with the same equipment was used with the Californium-252 source as 
the neutron source.  Several experiments were performed using the same procedure as the reactor 
experiments.  It was hoped that even with the lower flux of the 252Cf, the advantage of higher 
average neutron energy would produce superior results.  However, the hardened neutron 
spectrum of Californium did not produce improved results due to the relatively low flux at the 
target.  Longer count times were collected, up to 24 hours, but no new inelastic gamma rays were 
detected. 
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Figure 4.11.  Neutron detector response profile 1 m in front of the Cf-252 collimator. 
 
 
Figure 4.12.  Cf-252 collimator during its construction. 
 31
 CHAPTER 5 - Analysis and Results 
5.1 Overview of SBRS 
The SBRS method to detect IEDs is unique in that it does not seek to quantitatively 
analyze or to image a target, but rather employs template matching.  The only goal is to identify 
if the target contains an explosive.  This is done by looking at the responses that come back from 
a scanned target.  The target responses are then compared to the responses that would be present 
if an explosive were present.  A figure-of-merit and its standard deviation are used to form filter 
functions, which are compared to a cut off value that differentiates safe materials from explosive 
materials.  Ultimately, the SBRS method will use a combination of neutron and photon induced 
responses as well as other possible signatures such as the weight of a vehicle.  For the neutron 
induced signatures, after much experimentation, the five gamma-ray signatures in Table 5.1 were 
used to differentiate explosive-surrogate samples from inert samples. 
 
Table 5.1.  Signatures used in analysis. 
Signature 
Number 
Energy 
(MeV) Source 
1 0.871 Oxygen Capture 
2 1.262 Carbon Capture 
3 2.223 Hydrogen Capture 
4 2.31 Nitrogen Inelastic Scatter 
5 10.829 Nitrogen Capture 
 
Originally, neutron thermalization signatures were intended to be used.  It was found, 
however, after experimentation that these signatures were not as useful as expected due to 
repeatability problems.  The data collected from the two neutron detectors for two experiments 
are shown in Table 5.2, where detector 1 was bare and detector 2 was cadmium covered.  The 
experiments were not conducted for the same amount of time.  It was expected, however, that 
when the samples were compared to each other, for each experiment, they would have a similar 
ranking.  An example can be seen by looking at the results from detector two for FertA, which 
had the most counts of any sample in experiment one, but was third highest in Experiment 2.  
The most likely explanation for this is that neutron scattering takes place inside and outside of 
the target and scattering in the 1 gallon samples might have ultimately represented a small 
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 amount of the total scattering the neutrons underwent.  Therefore neutron scattering in the 
samples contributed only slightly to the total signature, resulting in the poor differentiation 
among samples.  It was decided that the 2.223 MeV prompt gamma ray was a better, more 
reliable indication of hydrogen content and the neutron signatures thus were not used in the 
analysis of results.   
 
Table 5.2.  Neutron detector counts for two experiments. 
Experiment 1 Experiment 2 
Detector 1 Detector 1 
Rubber 688460 Sand 193620
FertB 679042 Rubber 193588
FertA 677813 FertA 189764
Water 675136 FertB 189459
Sand 658116 Water 182169
Detector 2 Detector 2 
FertA 121416 Rubber 121974
Rubber 119961 FertB 95198
FertB 118395 FertA 93647
Water 117410 Sand 82171
Sand 116009 Water 50601
 
5.2 Template Matching Procedure 
 A template-matching technique is used that compares the vector R of N signatures 
from an unknown target to a template , which is a vector of signatures from a similar target 
known to have explosives present, for each of 
SA
1,2, , L=A …  configurations of the target.  The 
presence of a chemical explosive is detected if the vector R matches any one of the templates to 
a sufficient degree.  If there is no match, the target is presumed not to be explosive.   
A neutron beam is used to interrogate a target from some standoff distance.  A detector 
capable of energy discrimination records a spectrum from which several signatures are 
estimated.  Each signature is the net number of counts under a peak from a capture or inelastic-
scatter gamma ray from hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, or oxygen.  A figure-of-merit (FOM) of the 
following form is generated [19] 
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In Eq. (5), A  refers to a particular template among the total number L of templates in the library.  
The αi is a weight factor for the ith signature.  This allows tuning of the FOM to maximize the 
distinction between inert and explosive material by giving some signatures more importance and 
some less.  The weight factors are scaled so that =∑
( )
( )
, β is a factor that scales the measured 
signatures to the templates.  This will allow templates that were collected for different amounts 
of time to be compared.  σ2 (Ri) is the variance of the measured responses and σ2( Sil) is the 
variance of the template response.  These variances are automatically calculated by the Genie 
software which collects the data and given with the net area of the signature’s peak.  An estimate 
of the standard deviation of the figure-of-merit is given below [19] 
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Equations (5) and (6) are used to define the filter functions  
    ( ) ( )f λ ζ λσ ζ= ±A A
( ) 0
± ,    (7) 
where λ is a constant.  The value of λ establishes the confidence value of the system and is set by 
the user.  If ζ were distributed according to a normal distribution, setting λ=1 would imply a 68% 
confidence, λ=2 would represent 95% and λ=3 would represent a 99% confidence.  For this 
system however, the statistics are more closely represented by a chi-square distribution so these 
confidence intervals are just approximations.  A target is deemed benign, to a confidence 
determined by the value of λ, if f fλ− >  for all templates, where f0 is a specified cut-off 
value.  Alternatively, the target is deemed dangerous if ( ) 0f fλ+ < .  The test is inconclusive for 
targets for which neither test is true.  There is flexibility in the system by adjusting the f0 and the 
λ values.  Setting a higher value of λ will result in fewer false-negatives but more false-positives.  
A lower value of λ will result in fewer false-positives but more false-negatives 
For each experiment reported here, a single template was used and so L =1 and the 
subscript A  is not needed.  The template responses were the averages of the explosive surrogate 
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 net peak areas for each signature.  Thus, the ith signature for a sample is Ni, given by Eq. (3), and 
the ith signature for the template is given by  
( )
1
1 n
ej i
j
N N
n =
= ∑
)ej iN
1
ei  ,    (8) 
where (  is the net peak area for the jth explosive surrogate for signature i and n is the 
number of explosive surrogate samples tested.  Further, all samples were counted for the same 
length of time and thus = .  Thus, Eqs (5) and (6) take the simplified forms  β
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5.3 Results 
Many different experiments were run throughout the course of this project.  Initially, 10 
gallon samples were used in a 1 m3 aluminum box to simulate a car trunk.  As the project 
progressed, the method was refined and smaller samples were used.  Ultimately, 1 gallon 
containers inside a suitcase were decided upon to be the final testing arrangement.  Experiments 
were done for both neutron and photon interrogation in the same configuration so the results 
could be combined.  Two sets of experiments were conducted using the reactor in this final 
configuration.  For each experiment, the region of interest function of Genie software was used 
to solve for the net area of each peak (Ni) and the error in that measurement, σ (Ni).  After the 
data were collected, the task of optimizing the results was next.  The goal of using non-uniform 
weighting factors was to maximize the difference between the largest f+ metric for the explosive 
surrogates and the smallest f- metric for the inert materials.  The weighting factors were chosen 
to optimize the results for both sets of experiments and are shown in Table 5.3 and were used in 
all FOM calculations.   
 
 35
 Table 5.3.  Weighting factors. 
Element Energy MeV 
Weighting 
Factors 
Oxygen 0.871 0.3 
Carbon 1.262 0.2 
Hydrogen 2.223 0.5 
Nitrogen 2.31 0 
Nitrogen 10.829 0 
 
5.4 Nine Sample Experiment 
For this experiment, four inert samples were used - polyethylene, rubber mulch, sand, and 
water.  The explosive surrogates were FertA, FertB, and FertAB.  FertAB was run at the 
beginning, end, and middle of the experiment for repeatability assessment.  A numerical 
subscript was used to distinguish the multiple counts on FertAB.  Each sample was placed in the 
suitcase and a 30 minute live time count was collected with the reactor at 500 kW.  For this 
experiment, the average of the explosive surrogate responses and their errors, at each response 
energy, were taken to get the explosive template ( eiN ), and its standard deviation σ( eiN ). The 
net counts for each sample, at each energy (Ni), can be seen in Table 5.4, and the standard 
deviations are given in Table 5.5.  For each sample, equations (7), (9) and (10) were applied to 
get the results shown in Table 5.6. 
 
Table 5.4.  Net area for each signature in nine sample experiment. 
Sample 0.871 MeV 1.262 MeV 2.223 MeV 2.31 MeV 10.829 MeV 
FertA 12920 1080 24731 464 9 
FertB 12336 877 23532 298 4 
FertAB1 11617 955 22561 287 5 
FertAB2 11832 877 23223 0 7 
FertAB3 12401 1185 23961 0 11 
Polyethylene 12371 919 26881 0 2 
Rubber 12319 703 23486 331 9 
Sand 11300 920 20566 326 2 
Water 11838 849 25734 0 12 
Explosive Template 12221 995 23602 210 7 
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 Table 5.5.  Standard deviations for each signature in the nine sample experiment. 
Sample 0.871 MeV 1.262 MeV 2.223 MeV 2.31 MeV 10.829 MeV 
FertA 181 114 183 24 3 
FertB 183 119 184 19 2 
FertAB1 177 104 179 17 2 
FertAB2 181 133 181 0 3 
FertAB3 196 132 182 0 5 
Polyethylene 199 124 190 0 1 
Rubber 184 112 186 22 3 
Sand 172 110 177 18 1 
Water 195 111 190 0 4 
Explosive Template 184 120 182 12 3 
 
 
Table 5.6.  Results from nine sample experiment. 
Sample ζ σ(ζ) )()1( ζλ −σ ξ==−f  
Polyethylene 77.89 12.98 64.91 
Rubber 0.77 1.38 -0.61 
Sand 75.63 14.34 61.29 
Water 33.65 9.32 24.33 
Explosive surrogate ζ σ(ζ) )()1(λ = = ζ + σ ξ+f  
FertA 11.84 6.21 18.05 
FertB 0.19 0.81 1.01 
FertAB1 10.01 5.60 15.61 
FertAB2 1.86 2.64 4.50 
FertAB3 1.34 2.22 3.56 
 
As false-negatives are considered more important than false-positives, a fo value of 20 
could be chosen to distinguish between inert and explosive material.  This fo results in zero false-
negatives and one false-positive for rubber.  These results are reasonable, but not ideal.  The 
confidence interval is only λ=1, and to decrease the fo to have zero false-positives would result in 
five false-negatives.  The repeatability of the experiment can also be improved upon.  The figure 
of merit for FertAB varied from 3.56 to 15.61.  This is less than a 2σ variation but it would be 
good if σ (ζ) could be reduced. 
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 5.5 Fourteen Sample Experiment 
The next experiment was conducted with the goal of testing more samples, and collecting 
data for a longer time to get better results.  Each sample was irradiated at 500 kW and a 45 
minute live time count was done with the experiment spread out over three days.  Aluminum, 
chalk, polyethylene, rubber mulch, sand, water, and an empty can were used for inert samples.  
For the explosive surrogates, FertA, FertB and ammonium nitrate were used and FertAB was run 
four times for repeatability.  Again, the average of the explosive surrogate responses and their 
errors, at each response energy, were taken to get the explosive template ( eiN ), and its variance 
σ2( eiN ). The net counts for each sample, at each energy (Ni), can be seen in Table 5.7, and the 
standard deviation for each area, σ (Ni), is given in Table 5.8.  For each sample, equations (7), 
(9), and (10) were applied to get the results shown in Table 5.9.   
 
Table 5.7.  Net area for each signature in fourteen sample experiment 
 
Sample 0.871 MeV 1.262 MeV 2.223 MeV 2.31 MeV 10.829 MeV 
FertA 17610 1345 36923 703 16 
FertB 17620 1235 37471 451 15 
FertAB1 17485 1487 37561 435 17 
FertAB2 18355 1771 38317 343 12 
FertAB3 16542 1526 35753 297 18 
Polyethylene 18301 1538 43185 396 15 
Rubber 18534 1370 39965 501 11 
Sand 16707 1251 34134 494 11 
Water 16015 1483 39876 0 14 
Aluminum 17477 1297 35006 0 10 
Ammonium Nitrate 17654 1660 39274 674 17 
Chalk 15421 1513 32894 0 6 
Empty 15636 1314 33461 554 1 
FertAB4 16543 1402 36368 631 15 
Explosive Template 17401 1489 37381 505 16 
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 Table 5.8.  Variance for each signature in fourteen sample experiment. 
Sample 0.871 MeV 1.262 MeV 2.223 MeV 2.31 MeV 10.829 MeV 
FertA 223 135 225 27 5 
FertB 213 140 229 23 4 
FertAB1 222 138 225 18 5 
FertAB2 246 138 230 19 3 
FertAB3 203 133 221 17 6 
Polyethylene 227 143 242 21 4 
Rubber 224 126 236 22 3 
Sand 208 132 215 24 3 
Water 205 135 235 0 5 
Aluminum 213 136 217 0 5 
Ammonium Nitrate 208 165 236 27 4 
Chalk 196 135 220 0 2 
Empty 219 133 221 23 1 
FertAB4 215 149 233 24 6 
Explosive Template 219 143 228 24 5 
 
 
Table 5.9.  Results from fourteen sample experiment. 
Sample ζ σ(ζ) )()1( ζλ − σ ξ==−f  
Aluminum 28.62 8.08 20.54 
Chalk 113.74 18.24 95.49 
Polyethylene 154.55 19.25 135.30 
Rubber 34.96 10.29 24.67 
Sand 55.46 12.22 43.24 
Water 35.40 10.40 25.00 
Air (empty can) 85.98 16.12 69.87 
Sample ζ σ(ζ) )()1(λ = = ζ + σ ξ+f  
FertA 1.26 2.12 3.39 
FertB 0.52 1.22 1.73 
FertAB1 0.18 0.73 0.91 
FertAB2 7.09 5.19 12.29 
FertAB3 15.61 6.93 22.54 
FertAB4 7.21 4.95 12.16 
Ammonium nitrate 16.94 6.58 23.52 
 
These results were better but could still be improved upon.  Again, only a λ=1 confidence 
value could be used.  Here, if a fo value of 24 was used, there would be no false-negatives, no 
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 false-positives, and one inconclusive for aluminum.  The repeatability was improved from the 
last experiment with the longer count time.  In this case, the f- filter function values for FertAB 
varied from 0.91 to 22.54.  Considering a total range of 135, this may be considered acceptable. 
The repeatability variations were likely the result of a number of factors.  The largest 
contributor was most likely power fluctuation in the reactor.  As previously stated, the reactor 
was brought up to 500 kW and held there for the entirety of the experiments.  This power level 
was determined to be the highest the reactor could sustain for the several hours the experiments 
took place.  As the heat effects within the reactor decreased reactivity, the control rods had to be 
withdrawn to maintain power.  This was done several times throughout the experiment resulting 
in jumps and gradual drops in power level.  A 1% change in reactor power could have 
represented a several hundred count difference in some cases.  Repeatability variations could 
have also been the result of the way the peak areas were solved for using the ROI function.  
There was a certain degree of judgment as to where the peaks started as it was visually selected 
by the operator.  This may not have been identically selected for each peak resulting in variation 
in peak areas. 
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 CHAPTER 6 - Summary and Recommendations 
The research into SBRS suggests it is possible to differentiate dangerous targets that may 
contain as little as 3.8 L (1 gal or about 7 kg) of explosive material from targets whose contents 
are benign.  While the results were not perfect, the analysis did show that this could be achieved 
with no false-negatives and minimal false-positives with approximately 68% confidence.   
The greatest advantage of SBRS is that the entire technique can be automated and human 
interpretation can be removed.  Once signatures are collected, they are automatically compared 
to explosive library template responses.  The system will then simply display to the operator a 
green light for an inert sample, a red light for a potentially dangerous sample, or a yellow light if 
the test is inconclusive.  The SBRS system will require minimal user interface and training to 
operate.   
Neutron-based methods also have the ability to scan denser materials than other explosive 
detection methods.  This method has highly penetrating radiation for both the incident and 
generated radiation.  Neutrons in general, and especially high energy neutrons, will be able to 
penetrate deep into a target.  The generated prompt gamma rays and inelastically scattered 
gamma rays have high energies, and are more likely to escape the target and reach the detector.  
SBRS also has the potential to be a true stand-off technology.  All radiation-based 
methods suffer from signal fall off as a function of distance.  With this method, a slowly 
diverging beam of neutrons can be produced using a collimator but then the scattered and 
generated radiation fluxes will vary as 1/r2, where r is distance from the target.  However, with 
the highly penetrating nature of both the incident and generated radiation, this method has the 
potential to operate at distances up to several meters.   
The SBRS method is also highly adaptive.  Different responses, as well as the different 
values of fo, weight factors, and λ can be used depending on conditions and specific threats.  
Additional signatures can be added to the system analysis such as the weight of the target.  The 
SBRS method also has the potential to be used for more than just explosive detection.  This 
method could be adapted to look for contraband material such as drugs. 
The challenge with SBRS will be creating a large enough template library to be able to 
identify the explosives.  Templates have to be created for different sizes and shapes of 
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 explosives, in different configurations with respect to the detector and source.  Then, variations 
of each of these templates will need to be constructed for various “clutter” scenarios of having 
miscellaneous material packed around them.  However, once a sufficient library is created, the 
system will only improve with use as more templates are added and the library of templates is 
tailored to current threats. 
6.1 Future Work  
One of the difficulties in differentiation of the targets was the few viable signatures that 
were generated.  In the end, none of the inelastically scattered gamma rays were useful because 
so few counts were collected.  The inelastic scatter gamma responses had large uncertainty and 
did not differentiate well among the samples.  The 10.829 MeV would also be a good indication 
of nitrogen, but again, the low number of those capture gamma rays collected resulted in high 
uncertainty and poor distinction among samples. 
To help improve the differentiation, a deuterium on tritium target (D-T) neutron 
generator is in the process of being ordered.  The D-T generator will improve results in two 
ways.  The average neutron energy of a D-T generator is around 14 MeV, which will allow for 
the excitation of many more inelastic scatter gamma rays.  The intensity of the collimated beam 
from the D-T generator, with a source strength of around 1011 n cm-2 s-1, will be substantially 
higher than the intensities of the beams from the tangential beam tube or the Cf-252 source.  This 
will allow for shorter signature collections times.  
A new gamma-ray detector is also being ordered which will be electrically cooled.  The 
current HPGe detector is 20% efficient, and has to be cooled by liquid nitrogen, which presents a 
serious problem for a field prototype.  The new detector is 80% efficient, which will further 
reduce count times. 
Ultimately, the results from these preliminary experiments have shown that SBRS has the 
potential to identify small amounts of explosives at several meters distance, quickly, and with 
high sensitivity and good specificity. 
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 Appendix A - Sample MCNP5 Input Dataset 
A shield box around a point Cf-252 source 
c 
c 
c   VIEW TOWARD      +----------------------+ 
c   ENTRANCE         | +------------------+ | 
c   SLOT             | |        ^ x-axis  | | 
c                    | |        |         | | 
c   (z-axis into     | |        |         | | 
c    the plane       | |     +-----+      | | 
c                    | |     |--o--|------| |-----> y-axis 
c                    | |     +-----+      | | 
c                    | |                  | | 
c                    | |                  | | 
c                    | |                  | | 
c                    | +------------------+ | 
c                    +----------------------+ 
c 
c 
c ************** BLOCK 1 -- CELL CARDS ********************** 
c  unit's outer housing 
 100  3 -1.00   126 -111 112 -115 113 -114 
                (121:-122:-123:124:125:-126) 
                imp:n=1          $ housing less duct wall 
 101  3 -1.00   116 -126 112 -114 113 -111 
                (21:-22:-23:24:126:-116) 
                imp:n=1          $ housing wall w duct entrance 
c  innards 
 103  0         -121 122 123 -124 -125 126    imp:n=1 $ void inside unit 
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  104  0         -21 23 22 -24 -126 116        imp:n=1 $ entrance void 
c beam duct 
 1  3  -1.00   -11 12 13 -14 -116 200 
             (21:-23:-22:24:116:-200)   imp:n=1  $ duct housing 
 3  0        -21 23 22 -24 -116 200     imp:n=1  $ duct void 
c cells outside -- graveyard 
 4  0   -116 (-200:11:-12:-13:14)    imp:n=0  $ void outside left 
 5  0    116 (111:-112:-113:114:115) imp:n=0  $ void outside right 
 
c ************** BLOCK 2 -- SURFACE CARDS ******************* 
c SHIELD HOUSING SURFACES 
c   outsurfaces (4" thick walls) 
 111 PX   25.40   $ top outer  wall (10") 
 112 PY  -25.40   $ back outer wall (10") 
 113 PX  -25.40   $ bottom outer wall (-10") 
 114 PY   25.40   $ front outer wall (10") 
 115 PZ   25.40   $ right outer wall (10") 
 116 PZ  -25.40   $ left outer wall (10") 
c  inside walls of unit  (1' x 1' x 1') 
 121 PX   15.24   $ top outer  wall (6") 
 122 PY  -15.24   $ back outer wall (6") 
 123 PX  -15.24   $ bottom outer wall (-6") 
 124 PY   15.24   $ front outer wall (6") 
 125 PZ   15.24   $ right outer wall (6") 
 126 PZ  -15.24   $ left outer wall (6") 
c 
c  DUCT SURFACES 
c  outer duct walls (walls 4"thick) 
 11 PX  12.70   $ top outer duct wall (5") 
 12 PY  -12.70  $ back outer duct wall (5") 
 13 PX  -12.70  $ bottom outer duct wall (-5") 
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  14 PY  12.70   $ front outer duct wall (5") 
c   Inside duct walls (2" x 2") 
 21 PX  2.54    $ top inner duct wall (1") 
 22 PY  -2.54   $ back inner duct wall (-1") 
 23 PX  -2.54   $ bottom inner duct wall (-1") 
 24 PY  2.54    $ front inner duct wall (1") 
c   vertical plane for end of duct (duct walls 12" long) 
 200 PZ -55.88  $ duct mouth (1' from outer shld surface) 
 
c ************** BLOCK 3 -- COMMAND CARDS ******************* 
mode n             $ track neutrons 
nps  300000000       $ no. of fission neutrons to track 
c  void 
c 
c  Point fission Cf-252 source 
SDEF POS 0 0 0  ERG=d1  PART=1 
SP1  -3  1.025  2.926   $ Watt spectrum for Cf-252 
c  PRINT 110     $-- print data for first 50  starting electrons 
c 
c 
C  Tally 2: dose averaged over the entrance to the irradiator 
F2:n  116  115 200           $-- use flux detector at duct entrance 
FS2  21 -22 -23 24           $-- segments of surface 116 
c  --areas of scoring segments 
SD2  1161.288  638.708  638.708  116.128  25.8064 
     1161.288  638.708  638.708  116.128  25.8064 
      258.064  154.834  154.834  51.613   25.8064 
c  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
c   Modify tally to give dose rate for Cf-252 source: 
c   mrem/h = rem/neut x neuts/s x 1000 mrem/rem x 3600 s/h 
c   For KSU's Cf-252 (on 21/09/06 will get 4.11E7 neuts/sec 
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 c   THUS  mrem/h = (rem/neut) x 4.11E7 x 1000 x 3600 
c         mrem/h = (rem/neut) x 1.48E14 
c  ---------------------------------------------------------- 
FM2  1.48E14 
FC2  Dose is in mrem/h for CF-252 source on 21/09/06 
c ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
c  ambient neutron dose equiv. H*(10mm) [rem cm^2] (from T-D3 of S&F) 
c  Plane parallel (PAR) neutrons incident on ICRP sphere. 
c ------------------------------------------------------------------ 
de2    2.500E-08 1.000E-07 1.000E-06 1.000E-05 1.000E-04 1.000E-03 
       1.000E-02 2.000E-02 5.000E-02 1.000E-01 2.000E-01 5.000E-01 
       1.000E+00 1.500E+00 2.000E+00 3.000E+00 4.000E+00 5.000E+00 
       6.000E+00 7.000E+00 8.000E+00 1.000E+01 1.400E+01 1.700E+01 
       2.000E+01 
df2    8.000E-10 1.040E-09 1.120E-09 9.200E-10 7.100E-10 6.200E-10 
       8.600E-10 1.460E-09 3.500E-09 6.900E-09 1.260E-08 2.580E-08 
       3.400E-08 3.620E-08 3.520E-08 3.800E-08 4.090E-08 3.780E-08 
       3.830E-08 4.030E-08 4.170E-08 4.460E-08 5.200E-08 6.100E-08 
       6.500E-08 
c 
c  Tally 12: MCA spectrum with bins of width .01 MeV over (0,5.0)MeV 
F12:n  116 200            $-- flux at entrance & exit of duct 
FS12  21 -22 -23 24           $-- segments of surface 116 & 200 
c  --areas of scoring segments 
SD12  1161.288  638.708  638.708  116.128  25.8064 
      258.064   154.834  154.834  51.613   25.8064 
E12 0.0 99I 10.0               $-- set up energy channel grid 
c 
c  Write output source file: photons only leaving the irradiator 
c  SSW -116(2 3) PTY n 
c 
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c 
c                          MATERIALS 
c -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
c       material: borated polyethylene d=1.00 g/cm^3  CH2 + 8 wt% B4C 
c                 B-11 5.029; B-10 1.234; C 80.595; H 13.143 
c -------------------------------------------------------------------- 
m3    1001.50c -0.13143 
      5010.50c -0.01234 
      5011.50c -0.05029 
      6000.50c -0.80594 
MT3  poly.60t 
 
